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We gathered survey data on journalists’ political views in 17 Western 
countries. We then matched these data to outcomes from national 
elections, and constructed metrics of journalists’ relative preference for 
different political parties. Compared to the general population of voters, 
journalists prefer parties that have more left-wing positions overall (r’s 
-.47 to -.53, depending on the metric used), and that are associated with 
certain ideologies, namely environmentalism, feminism, social liberalism, 
socialism, and support for the European Union. We used Bayesian model 
averaging to assess the validity of the predictors in multivariate models. We 
found that, of the ideology tags in our dataset, ‘conservative’ (negative), 
‘nationalist’ (negative) and ‘green’ (positive) were the most consistent 
predictors with nontrivial effect sizes. We also computed estimates of the 
skew of journalists' political views in different countries. Overall, our 










It is widely claimed that the media leans left or is 
biased against non-left-wing views [1-4]. However, such 
claims have been disputed by others [5,6]. One significant 
limitation of the empirical literature on media bias is that 
it is narrowly focused on the United States [7], a problem 
with quantitative media research generally [8]. Hence we 
attempted to quantify the political skew of the Western 
media as a whole.
How can one study political bias in the media? We are 
aware of three main approaches. First, one can analyze 
who owns or funds the media. This approach is based on 
the assumption that owners exert some kind of influence 
over the outlets they own. Interestingly, both far-left and 
far-right commentators have cited analyses of media 
owners in support of their views. Far-left commentators 
have highlighted that the media are owned almost entirely 
by the wealthy, who tend to hold conservative views on 
economic issues [9]. Hence if owners do influence the 
outlets they own, it would tend to be in the direction of 
maintaining the status quo, which is assumed to benefit 
them. On the far right, commentators have taken a similar 
approach, except that instead of emphasising owners’ 
wealth, they have focussed on their ethnicity. In particular, 
it has been claimed that Jewish-owned media tend to 
support specific interests such as defending Israel, or 
trying to undermine nationalism in Western countries [10,11].
*Corresponding Author:
Emil O. W. Kirkegaard,
Ulster Institute for Social Research, Denmark;
Email: emil@emilkirkegaard.dk
27
Journal of Psychological Research | Volume 03 | Issue 03 | July 2021
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
journalists comprising the lion’s share of the workforce. 
As a matter of fact, our initial analysis of surveys of 
media personnel indicated that journalists constitute 
the vast majority of respondents to such surveys. As a 
consequence, any survey-based approach would have to 
focus on journalists, while analysing data on, say, editors 
only if it happened to be reported.
We took the approach of analysing media personnel 
themselves because we found that it was relatively 
easy to track down surveys from a variety of countries, 
including many that had received little previous attention, 
especially in the English language literature (e.g. Polish 
and Scandinavian surveys). Note that it would be much 
more difficult to analyse data from many countries using 
content analysis because the relevant models do not easily 
generalize across languages. Hence our approach can be 
considered particularly useful in this regard. We decided 
to focus our attention solely on Western countries because 
language barriers would have been prohibitive for non-
Western countries.
A number of previous cross-national surveys of 
journalists have been carried out. Yet these did not 
generally include questions about voting behavior (or 
vote intentions), but only self-placement on a left-right 
scale. We consider this unsatisfactory in the present 
context because of the reference group effect, namely that 
journalists might rate themselves in comparison to others 
within their profession and extended network, rather 
than with respect to the general population. Furthermore, 
previous research has shown that self-placement is only 
moderately correlated with more complex measures 
of political views, such as factors derived from many 
multiple-choice questions [19-21]. To avoid this issue, we 
decided to collect data on journalists’ voting behaviour or 
vote intentions.
1.1 How Media Bias Works: The Distortion Model
Before proceeding to the methods section, it is worth 
outlining the main causal model for the relationship 
between journalists’ political views and media bias, which 
we consider to be the distortion model [7]. The model 
can be divided into three parts, which we will discuss 
in turn. First, survey evidence indicates that journalists 
have considerable leeway as to which stories they write 
and how they write them. By and large, journalists seek 
out stories in the information stream that surrounds them, 
which happens to include a lot of other journalists. Here 
political leanings are relevant, given that journalists 
are presumably more interested in stories that cast a 
favourable light on persons, parties or organizations with 
which they identify, as well as stories that cast a negative 
A second approach to studying media bias is to analyze 
the content of the media itself [12,13]. Traditionally, this 
involved reading through media output, and then manually 
coding it as supporting one ideology or another. Because this 
method relies on the subjective judgment of coders [9], it is 
open to the criticism that those coders themselves might 
be biased, or that there are second-order effects whereby 
sources seem right-wing while being neutral, due to 
most other media being left-wing [7]. In addition to these 
criticisms, manual coding is extremely labor intensive 
and is therefore difficult to implement in practice. To get 
around these issues, studies have increasingly relied on 
machine learning analysis of media content [14].
One study ranked media outlets from liberal to 
conservative by comparing the number of times they 
cited various think tanks or policy groups to the number 
of times those groups were cited by Democrat versus 
Republican members of the US Congress. Media outlets 
that tended to cite groups more often cited by Democrats 
were classified as more liberal, whereas those that tended 
to cite groups more often cited by Republicans were 
classified as more conservative [15]. In a related study, 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) [16] trained algorithms to 
identify the phrases that most differentiated Democrat 
versus Republican members of Congress, and then 
classified newspapers based on how frequently they 
used the phrases that were typical of Democrats versus 
Republicans. Their rank ordering of major US news 
outlets was similar to the one obtained by Groseclose and 
Milyo (2005) [15], and they found that most news outlets 
had a left-wing tilt. (Interestingly, they also found that 
ownership of media outlets was of comparatively minor 
importance).
Another way to utilise machine learning is to train 
algorithms to code media content based on text cues 
which may be incomprehensible to humans but that do 
show predictive validity [17]. This necessitates having a 
text corpus with known (or assumed) political leanings, 
which can be obtained either by recruiting humans to 
evaluate a subset of the data, or by relying on sources with 
known (or assumed) positions, such as politicians who 
have given speeches. For example, Budak et al. (2016) [17] 
used human judges to rate a subset of their data, and then 
evaluated the remaining, very large dataset using complex, 
trained models. Their method yielded a similar ranking 
of US news outlets to those that have been reported in 
previous studies.
A third approach to studying media bias is to 
analyse data on media personnel themselves [18]. Media 
organizations employ a variety of workers, the most 
important of whom are journalists and editors, with 
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bias [22].
Together, the three tendencies outlined above result in a 
consistent slant of media output in line with the journalist’s 
political preferences. The model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
At each stage, some level of political bias enters into the 
journalistic production process, and that bias accumulates 
across the stages, resulting in output that becomes 
progressively closer to the journalists’ own views.
2. Data Collection and Metrics
2.1 Data Collection and Initial Coding
We searched the published literature for surveys of 
journalists that included questions on voting behavior 
or vote intentions. This search yielded comparatively 
few relevant articles, and we therefore turned to works 
such as dissertations, reports, and newspaper articles. 
The reports were often written in the local language (e.g. 
French in France), and were often published by journalist 
associations or media organizations. In other cases, 
newspapers themselves conducted surveys and reported 
the results in their own pages, almost invariably in the 
local language.
To collect these data, we were assisted by a diverse 
team of international research assistants who could read 
the local language, and knew where to look or whom 
to ask. When we were unable to find anyone, we wrote 
to local journalist associations and relevant academics 
asking if they knew of any relevant sources. In general, 
our search was multi-faceted: Google Scholar, Google 
advanced search, asking friends from relevant countries, 
asking for assistance on social media platforms such as 
Twitter and Reddit, etc.
The resulting sources were saved to a publicly accessible 
repository at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.
io/6uvnu/). Online sources were archived to prevent link 
rot or deletion of primary source material. Data from the 
sources were coded using a standardized format, and entered 
into a publicly accessible spreadsheet at Google Drive. 
Usually some adjustments to the data were needed, and these 
were done in a dedicated sheet within the spreadsheet so 
that everything was fully documented. The most common 
adjustment concerns respondents who declined to say or 
didn’t know whom they had voted for. In particular, these 
individuals were ignored, and the definite preferences were 
normalized to 100% by dividing by the sum of the definite 
preferences. An example of this is shown in Table 1.
This method effectively assumes that people who didn’t 
contribute data would have voted in the same relative 
proportions as their counterparts who did. In reality, this 
assumption is probably somewhat inaccurate, and one 
light on persons, parties or organisations to which they are 
opposed. This kind of bias has been termed gatekeeping 
or selectivity in the previous literature [22]. Although note 
that a recent US study found no evidence of a liberal bias 
in which news stories political journalists choose to cover [6] 1.
Second, journalists have many options concerning 
which sources to seek out when writing a story. Suppose 
a local university has just rolled out a new policy. If a 
particular journalist happens to support the new policy, he 
can choose to seek out only or predominantly sources that 
are likely to speak in its favor. Because there are always 
many relevant sources that could be sought out, some 
kind of selection has to be made. And one would expect 
this selection to produce a list of sources that comports 
with the journalist’s own preferences. On some occasions, 
journalists may seek out particularly ill-informed 
members of the opposing side of the story, so as to make 
that side “look bad”. When writing a story about the local 
university’s new policy, the journalist could seek out a 
well-spoken professor who supports it, and a dissenting 
individual who is known to make particularly incoherent 
arguments.
Third, journalists have to make decisions about which words 
or images to use when writing a story [23]. How should a given 
individual be introduced or labeled? Consider Charles 
Murray, the author of the controversial book The Bell 
Curve, which is about intelligence and social inequality 
in the United States. Should he be described as ‘far-right’, 
‘controversial’, or a ‘pseudoscientist’? These are certainly 
labels that have been used for him. Or maybe he should 
be described as ‘a scholar associated with the American 
Enterprise Institute’, which emphasizes his political 
association with the libertarian-leaning think tank, or 
even as a ‘leading scholar of American inequality’, which 
emphasizes his intellectual contributions.
Choices over how to describe particular individuals are 
inevitable when writing about politics, and the distortion 
model assumes that journalists’ choice of words reflects 
their own political preferences. A journalist with left-wing 
views will tend to see everybody else as comparatively 
right-wing, while a journalist with right-wing views will 
tend to see everybody else as comparatively left-wing. 
This kind of bias has previously been labeled statement 
1 The authors ran a correspondence experiment in which they emailed 
a large number of journalists on behalf of a fictitious candidate for the 
state legislature, and asked each one whether she would be able to cover 
the candidate. They found that journalists were not significantly more 
likely to cover the candidate when he was described as conservative, 
as compared to when he was described as liberal. However, we do not 
believe this provides compelling evidence for the authors’ conclusions 
because it could be ideologically advantageous for journalists to cover a 
candidate from the opposing party. For example, it might allow them to 
misrepresent the candidate or to cast his views in an unfavourable light.
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a range of 72 to 1,338. The mean/median proportion 
of journalists who provided party preference data was 
0.75/0.79 (sd = 0.17). On average, there was a mean/
median of 2.5/1.0 surveys by country.
2.2 Relative Preference Metrics
To estimate journalists’ political preferences, one needs 
a reference population to serve as an anchor. Since we had 
decided to focus on journalists’ voting behaviour or vote 
intentions, we utilised data from the national election that 
was nearest in time to the relevant journalist survey. In a 
few cases, we averaged two elections equidistant in time 
(details are given in the Calculations sheet). Political skew 
was defined as any deviation of journalists’ preferences 
from those of the general voting population. Of course, 
such skew could be in either one of two directions: 
journalists might prefer a given party more or less than the 
general voting population.
Because of disagreement about the optimal metric to 
use (the authors could not even agree), we decided on a 
pluralistic approach, and employed several metrics. First, we 
used the delta %point (d) metric. This is the simplest metric, 
and is defined as journalist% - general%, i.e., the number 
of %points that journalists vote more for a given party 
than the general population. When negative, it means that 
journalists vote for the party less than the general population. 
The metric could be seen as problematic for smaller parties 
because it fails to capture the relative aspect of party support. 
If journalists are 5 ppts more likely to vote for a particular 
party, it may matter whether that party enjoys 5% or 50% 
support in the general population.
The second metric we used is the relative risk (RR), which 
takes into account the relative party sizes. This is defined 
as journalist% / general%, and captures the differences 
in relative support. In the case of 0% support among the 
can come up with hypotheses as to how the method might 
bias results either to the left or to the right [7,24]. One might 
expect a bias towards the political centre from the left 
because very left-wing journalists will decline to state 
their preferences, cognizant that the surveys will reveal 
the overall leanings of their profession, which would 
not be in their interest if they want to appear as neutral 
reporters of the truth. Alternatively, one might expect a 
bias toward the left from the right because right-wing 
journalists might not dare to state their true preferences 
even in anonymous surveys. It is possible to quantitatively 
analyze the question by examining whether surveys with 
more abstainers produced different findings than those 
with less, or by asking about voting intentions in more 
circumspect ways [25,26].
The sample size of the surveys included in our analysis 
had a mean/median of 542/500, with a range from 89 to 
1640. The effective sample size (number with definite 
preference given) had a mean/median of 418/408 with 
Figure 1. Sketch of the distortion model for the journalistic process.
Table 1. Calculation example for vote normalization. 
Polish journalists for 2005 parliament election (1st round).
Party % of journalists
% of votes 
cast
Social Democracy of Poland 3 3.33
Democratic Left Alliance 4 4.44
Democratic Party 9 10
Civic Platform 60 66.67
Polish People’s Party 0 0
Law and Justice 11 12.22
Self-Defence of the Republic of 
Poland 0 0
League of Polish Families 0 0
Real Politics Union 3 3.33
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is that they are undefined when journalists have zero support 
for a given party in our samples. This problem arises 
due to sampling error for parties that have low levels of 
support among journalists (assuming that journalists never 
have exactly 0% support for a party). Thus, excluding the 
undefined data points would result in a data bias because 
of the excluded data’s relation to the outcome of interest 
(i.e., there would be nonrandom missing data). We therefore 
conducted a simulation study to investigate the best way 
to adjust the data. We found that a local regression model 
based on sample size performed well. We imputed the best 
guess of support for parties where 0% was observed with a 
given sample size. After that, the support for other parties 
was adjusted downwards slightly so that the sum was again 
100%. This essentially mimics a Bayesian approach with a 
weak prior. See the supplementary materials for more details 
about this procedure.
2.3 Party Data
Figure 2. Infobox on Wikipedia for Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
general population, the metric would be undefined. However, 
given that journalists are part of the general population, this 
scenario is impossible, and never occurred in our data. One 
problem with the relative ratio is that it is harder for larger 
parties to have high ratios than smaller parties. If a party is 
already at 20% general population support, the maximum RR 
is 5 because journalists cannot support it more than 100%. 
For a party with 5% support among the general population, a 
relative ratio of 20 is possible.
The third metric we used, which takes into account the 
reciprocal of support for each party, is the odds ratio (OR), 
defined as (journalist-support% / journalist-non-support%) 
/ (general-support% / general-non-support%). This metric 
is commonly used when modeling binary outcomes for 
statistical reasons (e.g. as log odds in a logistic regression), 
but is less intuitive. The relative risk and odds ratio measures 
suffer from a non-linearity problem relating to the direction 
of coding. The RR can theoretically be almost infinitely 
large, but cannot be lower than 0. A solution for this is to 
log10 transform the metric. This results in a linear (i.e., 
interval) scale where a 2-unit decrease in the score has the 
same meaning as a 2-unit increase. Table 2 shows a few 
examples of the metrics.
Table 2. Example calculations of preference metrics.
Journalist% General% d RR OR log10RR log10OR
45 20 25 2.25 3.27 0.35 0.51
35 10 25 3.50 4.85 0.54 0.69
15 10 5 1.50 1.59 0.18 0.20
10 10 0 1 1 0 0
10 15 -5 0.67 0.63 -0.18 -0.20
10 35 -25 0.29 0.21 -0.54 -0.69
20 45 -25 0.44 0.31 -0.35 -0.51
None of the metrics are entirely satisfactory. For 
instance, while the log10RR takes into account the relative 
support without nonlinearity problems, it does not give any 
information about the overall importance of the difference. If 
a party has 1% support among the general population and 3% 
support among journalists, this would constitute a threefold 
difference in attitudes, but would not be very important in 
terms of overall voting behavior. The d metric would clearly 
show this, however, while providing less information about 
the differences in relative support. A difference in party 
support of 80% versus 90% might not be taken to have the 
same importance as a difference of 1% versus 11%, say, even 
though both differences have a d-value of 10% points. We 
decided to report detailed results from the d and log10RR 
metrics in the main text. Results for the other metrics can be 
found in our supplementary materials.
One particular problem with the log transformed metrics 
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Table 3. Political party ideology tag tabulation. LW = left-wing, RW = right-wing.
Rank Tag Proportion Count Rank Tag Proportion Count
1 conservative 0.45 86 12 RW_populism 0.13 25
2 liberalism 0.40 76 13 democratic_socialism 0.12 22
3 EU_positive 0.23 43 14 national_conservatism 0.11 21
4 EU_skeptic 0.21 41 15 agrarianism 0.08 15
5 populism 0.18 35 16 feminism 0.07 13
6 green 0.18 34 17 communism 0.07 13
7 nationalism 0.17 33 18 libertarianism 0.05 10
8 social_democracy 0.17 32 19 centrism 0.04 7
9 social_liberalism 0.17 32 20
direct_
democracy 0.04 7
10 christian 0.15 28 21 LW_populism 0.03 5
11 socialism 0.14 27
wing to far-right”). In almost every case, we removed 
any other descriptions given, and converted the political 
position into a numerical scale from -3 to 3, reflecting 
the 7 possible descriptors used.2 The descriptors were 
then averaged for each party. For parties with two listed, 
this resulted in half integer values (e.g. 2.5 for “right to 
far right”). Figure 3 shows the distribution of political 
positions in the data. The mean/median position was 
0.05 with a standard deviation of 1.40 and skew of 0.01. 
Thus, it was nearly perfectly symmetrical despite having 
a bimodal shape. This seems to indicate a relative lack 
of bias in Wikipedia’s positioning of parties, since bias 
would have presumably skewed the distribution in a 
particular direction.
2.4 Independent Party Ratings
To check the validity of Wikipedia’s party ratings, 
we recruited 25 individuals to rate all 197 parties in 
our dataset on a 7-point scale from “far-left” to “far-
right” (including non-integer values, if desired). These 
individuals were recruited online via Facebook groups for 
people interested in politics, and via participant referral 
(snowballing). Each individual received approximately 
300 DKK (45 USD) for participating. Raters were told 
that they could use any approach they wanted, except that 
they should not use Wikipedia, and should not simply 
copy-and-paste ratings from another source, including 
another participant. They were not told the purpose of the 
study. 23 out of 25 raters were Danish (the remaining two 
were Dutch and Portugese, respectively); 60% were male; 
and they were aged between 17 and 30. The raters were 
2 One party was described as “syncretic” which we also coded as 0.
Sweden_Democrats).
By combining data from surveys of journalists and 
general elections, we computed metrics of relative support 
for political parties. There were 151 parties with at least 
one relative preference datapoint in our sample. By itself, 
however, this information is not informative. One also 
needs some information about the parties themselves. 
Instead of relying on the authors’ judgment of party 
political ideology and relative placement (which could 
of course be biased), we relied on the English language 
Wikipedia as an external source. English Wikipedia has 
pages for all of the parties in our dataset (n = 197), and 
provides ideological and relative placement data in a 
semi-structured format called the infobox. We retrieved 
and processed this information automatically using a web 
scraper. Political left-right position data were available for 
93% of the parties (n = 184), and political ideology data 
for 97% (n = 191). Missing data were mostly confined 
to small or defunct parties. Figure 2 shows a part of the 
infobox for a party (Sweden Democrats, from Sweden). 
The information of interest is given by Ideology and 
Political position. For political ideology, we cleaned 
the references (i.e., the numbers in brackets) and any 
explanatory text in parentheses (not shown in example). 
This results in a tag set for every party. The tags across 
pages were not entirely standardized, so to reduce the 
number of tags to a more manageable quantity, we 
recoded and merged a few of them. The details of this 
procedure are given in the supplementary materials. Table 
3 shows the frequency distribution for the ideology tags.
For political positions, nearly all the descriptors refer 
to a relative position between far-left and far-right, 
sometimes with two descriptors being used (e.g. “right-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jpr.v3i3.3282
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Figure 3. Political positions of parties according to English Wikipedia position data.
recruited by a research assistant who was also not aware 
of the study’s purpose.
There was no evidence of cheating on the part of 
raters. No two raters were suspiciously similar in ratings 
(maximum r = .91, 2nd highest, r = .80, mean = .63), 
suggesting they had not copied one another. And none of 
the raters gave ratings that were suspiciously similar to 
Wikipedia’s positions (maximum r = .85, mean r = .66), 
suggesting that they had complied with our instruction 
not to use Wikipedia. Measures of internal consistency for 
the average party ratings were good, although two of the 
raters gave ratings that were only weakly correlated with 
the others’ (r’s .15 and .36). The intraclass correlation was 
= .54 (.61 without two poor raters), Chronbach’s alpha was 
.97 (.97 without two poor raters), and the median correlation 
was .61 (.63 without two poor raters). Clustering the ratings 
by similarity did not reveal any obvious effects of age, sex or 
Danish nationality.
Overall, the mean party ratings were strongly correlated 
with Wikipedia’s ratings: across 183 parties for which 
Wikipedia ratings were available, r = .86, shown in Figure 4.3
3 The discrepancy with the number of parties in the Wikipedia data, 184, 
is that we mistakenly omitted one party from the list of parties given to 
the raters, and therefore have no rating data for this party (Pirate Party 
Germany). However, since the party in question is relatively minor, this 
One interesting difference between Wikipedia’s ratings 
and participants’ ratings is that participants labelled 
parties as “far-right” less often than Wikipedia. (Note the 
relative lack of parties in the top right of the plot). This 
may be due to our raters being slightly more right-wing 
than average, Wikipedia having a left-wing bias, or raters 
interpreting “far-right” as referring to Neo-Nazi parties, 
of which there are none in our dataset (their voter support 
was too low, and they were outlawed in some countries). 
Overall, however, the average participant ratings strongly 
corroborate the measures derived from Wikipedia.
2.5 Data Exclusion Rules
We excluded parties that received less than 2% in the 
general election. The journalist samples are generally too 
small to calculate accurate preference metrics for such 
parties, and they would therefore mostly contribute noise 
to the results. They are also of little practical importance 
since they enjoy no real political power in the countries 
where they are found.4 This resulted in 19 excluded cases 
(of 151, 13%). As a robustness test, we analyzed the effect 
omission is unlikely to have affected our results.
4 Most countries have election thresholds at higher values than 2%, with 
an average of about 4% across the countries in our dataset.
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The simplest way to analyze the data is to examine the 
left-right position of parties, and the relative preferences 
of journalists for or against those parties. We report results 
based on both participants’ party ratings and Wikipedia’s 
party ratings. Our two preferred metrics, d and log10RR, 
are shown in Figures 5-8.
The figures indicate that there is a relatively strong 
relationship, whereby journalists tend to prefer parties with 
more left-wing positions overall. For Wikipedia’s ratings: 
r = -.47 for d, r = -.53 for log10RR. And for participants’ 
ratings: r = -.50 for d, r = -.53 for log10RR. In fact, the 
relationship was about equal in strength across all of our 
metrics and rating sources. For Wikipedia’s ratings: r = -.48 
for RR, r = -.40 for OR, and r = -.53 for logOR. And for 
participants’ ratings: r = -.53 for RR, r = -.47 for OR, and r 
= -.54 for logOR. The relationship is somewhat nonlinear 
when using the Wikipedia data: the maximum differential 
in support is for center-left parties, rather than for far-
left parties. A likelihood ratio test of a linear vs. nonlinear 
(spline) model supports this conclusion for the logRR 
metric and is borderline-significant for the d metric: d adj. 
R2 21.3% vs. 24.4%, p = 0.052; logRR: 27.4% vs. 31.7%, 
p = .016). The nonlinearity was not evident in the rater 
data (model comparisons p’s .48 and .17, for d and logRR 
metrics, respectively).
of this data exclusion, to be discussed later.
3. Analyses
There are a number of ways to analyze the dataset we 
assembled. The analyses reported here are to some degree 
exploratory because it was not clear how best to analyze 
the data before we gathered it, and we were therefore 
unable to pre-register our analyses [27].
To avoid giving more weight to parties for which we 
had multiple surveys, all voting data were averaged at 
the party level. In addition, parties were weighted so that 
each country had the same overall weight, at least initially 
(i.e. each party was assigned a weight of 1/n, where n is 
the number of parties with data for that country). This 
prevented countries with more parties from exerting a 
disproportionate influence on the results.5
3.1 Left-right Position
5 The election threshold (minimum vote% needed to gain any seat) 
has an impact on the number of parties that make it into a country’s 
parliament. Since countries differ with respect to this threshold, some 
countries have a lot more unique, smaller parties, and others fewer 
and larger ones. The USA and the Netherlands represent the extreme 
positions on this since the USA has a de facto 2 party system and the 
Netherlands has no election threshold with 150 seats (i.e., one needs 
0.67% of the vote to gain a seat).
Figure 4. Wikipedia political positions vs. rater political estimates.
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Figures 5-8. Party political position and journalists’ relative preference for the d and log10RR metrics. Orange line = 
OLS fit, blue line = LOESS fit.
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3.2 Ideology Tags
Next, we turn to our ideology tags. Here we begin 
by taking a univariate approach, calculating an average 
(central tendency) for each tag. We chose the weighted 
mean and median as our estimators.6 Figure 9 shows the 
results for the logRR metric.
Compared to the general voting population, journalists 
prefer parties that are associated with the following 
ideologies: green parties/environmentalism, feminism, 
support for the European Union, socialism. Conversely, 
journalists are less likely than the general voting 
population to support parties associated with the following 
ideologies: national conservatism, libertarianism, 
populism, nationalism and conservatism. Tables S1 and 
S2 in the Supplementary Information give the numerical 
results.
In some cases, the magnitude of journalists’ relative 
preferences was quite large. Across the two versions of 
RR, the general population votes about 6.1 times more for 
national conservative parties as journalists do, whereas 
journalists vote about 3.0 times more for green parties.7 
For robustness, we analysed the data using unweighted 
versions as well as using the log10OR metric. However, 
doing so made relatively little difference to the results. 
The correlations across combinations of metrics were very 
strong with a mean/median correlation of r = .89/.91.
3.3 Multivariate Analyses
Having seen that both left-right position and most 
ideology tags are associated with journalists’ relative 
preferences, we now tackle the more complicated question 
of how to combine the predictors into a single model. In 
particular, we have only about 120 cases with complete 
data, but 22 interrelated predictors. The predictors consist 
of the 21 tags and the overall political position, of which 
we have two versions. We also have three different 
outcome variables. Given these limitations, we did not 
expect to get useful results from OLS regression.
6 The unweighted median is the middle datapoint in a set of numbers 
ranked by value. If there are an even number of datapoints, the mean of 
the two middle datapoints is used. The weighted median works the same 
way, but applies the weights (1/number of parties in that country) to 
increase or decrease the relative size of each datapoint along the ranking, 
and then chooses the middle one as usual.
7 The outlier in the figure for the green tag is Youth Party – European 
Greens ,  from Slovenia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youth_
Party_%E2%80%93_European_Greens), which obtained anomalously 
low support among journalists in a sample of 300 journalists from 2009. 
As a matter of fact, the result is probably due to sampling error, given 
that the party received only 2.6% among the general population and 0.3% 
among the journalists. This is a difference of only a few individuals in 
the sample, and illustrates the extreme sampling error problem with the 
RR and OR metrics when the level of support for a party is low.
In macroeconomics, a similar issue arises when using 
country-level data. Consequently, some economists 
have begun using a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) 
approach8 [28-31]. This method involves fitting all the 
possible regressions (where possible, otherwise sampling 
1000s of them), and seeing which predictors tend to be 
included in the best models, and how strong they are in 
these models. It is conceptually similar to best subset 
selection [32], and is a form of meta-analysis [33]. We fit 
BMA to our dataset using the BMS package [34]. We used 
the default settings for the package, and analyzed the 
complete set of models since this was computationally 
feasible. In our case, there were 21-22 predictors yielding 
2-4 million models to evaluate (runtime on a laptop was a 
few minutes for each set). We did this for each of the three 
outcome metrics (d, log10RR, and log10OR), and each 
of the two sets of political position data (Wikipedia and 
rater-based). We left out the populism tag because of its 
redundancy with respect to the directional populism tags 
(right-wing populism and left-wing populism).
Because the output from these analyses is rather 
lengthy, we have confined it to the supplementary 
materials (see Tables S3-S6). In an ideal world, there 
would be variables that are clearly important in all 
models, and variables that are not. In addition, the same 
variables would be important no matter which outcome 
metric, or which version of the political position data, 
we use. Unfortunately, our output tables showed that 
reality is not quite so clear. For example, in the first meta-
analysis (Wikipedia data + d outcome) the ‘conservative’ 
tag variable was included in 97% of the best models. The 
effect size was quite large at -9.7 (i.e, journalists’ vote% 
was 9.7% lower for parties tagged as ‘conservative’, 
holding the other variables constant). However, when we 
compared these results to the parallel results based on 
the rating data, we found that this tag was only included 
in 85% of the best models, though it still had a sizable 
beta of -7.7. And when we looked at the results based on 
log10RR, the same tag was only included in 93% and 
66% of the best models (for Wikipedia dating and rating 
data, respectively). This shows that modelling choices 
matter for the stability of the results.
For the sake of simplicity, we looked for variables 
that appeared to be useful across the four meta-analyses 
corresponding to our preferred specifications (Tables S3-
S4). We somewhat arbitrarily defined ‘useful’ variables 
as those that 1) had a PIP of at least 10%, and 2) had a 
post mean effect size larger than trivial (d > 1, |log10RR| 
8 This method is also called Bayesian averaging of classical estimates 
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the general population of voters. The strength of this skew 
varies from -0.17 to -0.96, with a mean/SD of -0.58/0.26. 
If instead we look at the rater data, we see a left-bias for 
16 out of 17 countries, with a mean/SD of -0.52/0.26. The 
only notable difference is that Slovenia has a very slight 
right-bias in the rater data, probably related to the issue 
with small parties we discussed earlier. It can also be 
observed that countries differ substantially in their mean 
political position, and that these differences make intuitive 
sense. Poland stands out in our dataset as particularly 
right-wing (0.98 and 1.11, respectively) and indeed, it is 
generally known as a conservative, Catholic country. On 
the other hand, the general populations in the Netherlands 
and Germany are rated as left-of-center in our dataset. 
This is somewhat puzzling for Germany, given that the 
country has been governed by center-right parties since 
2005 (headed by Angela Merkel). Generally speaking, 
the results in Table 4 should be taken as a first attempt at 
quantifying the skew of journalists in different countries, 
and not as something definitive.
3.5 Robustness Checks
We have already seen that the tag-based results were 
fairly robust to the outcome metric and the use of weights 
> .05, i.e. 10% increase). Given these criteria, the most 
important variables were: ‘conservative’ (negative), 
‘nationalism’ (negative), and ‘green’ (positive). Thus, our 
multivariate analysis shows that these seem to be the most 
useful variables that have an appreciable effect size. The 
conclusion is not necessarily that other variables don’t 
matter, but just that their effects are difficult to detect with 
a high degree of confidence in the current dataset.
3.4 Left-right Position by Country
Using the party preference data and the political 
position of parties, it is possible to calculate the overall 
political position of the general population in a country, 
the position of journalists in that country, and the 
difference between them. The latter may be taken as an 
overall estimate of the left-right skew of the journalists 
in a particular country. However, given that some of 
the data on journalists were obtained from ad hoc 
samples, individual estimates are subject to considerable 
uncertainty, and should be interpreted with caution. Table 
4 shows the values for the countries with available data, 
ordered by the magnitude of the skew.
Based on the Wikipedia data, it can be observed that, in 
16 out of 16 countries, journalists are more left-wing than 
Figure 9. Journalists’ relative support for parties by political ideology. Red diamonds correspond to the weighted 
median for each tag in the log10 RR metric.
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very low levels of support in the general population on the 
grounds that these data would be afflicted by substantial 
sampling error. We examined the effect of trying different 
thresholds for exclusion, including none. Figure 10 shows 
the results across method choices.
Here we see that changing the threshold from 0 to 10% 
leads to an increase in the effect size, presumably due to 
removal of cases with large errors. At a threshold of 10% 
mark, only 59 cases out of the original 151 remain in the 
analysis. Thus our decision to only remove parties with 
less than 2% support seems to be a rather conservative 
choice that tended to weaken the results slightly.
Third, we tried dropping data from older sources. 
While we sought to identify the newest possible sources, 
especially surveys from the last 20 years, we sometimes 
had to rely on older sources. The publication dates of the 
surveys included in our analysis range from 1997 to 2017, 
but most of the data were of more recent origin: mean/
SD = 2008/5.6. Did the inclusion of older data affect our 
results? If we drop the data from before 2005, the sample 
size changes from 132 to 100, and the results change from 
-.50 to -.55 (rating data, d metric), -.55 to -.58 (rating, 
log10RR), -.47 to -.50 (Wikipedia, d), and -.54 to -.57 
(cf. Section 3.2). However, there are other decisions that 
might have influenced the results. (Note that we also 
compiled data on the political attitudes of other media 
personnel. These are provided in Tables S7-S8 in the 
Supplementary Information.)
First, recall that we used a pseudo-Bayesian approach 
to move the 0 values away from exact zero, so as to 
ensure that our RR values would be meaningful. (Observed 
values of 0 result in relative ratios (RR’s) of 0, and thus 
infinite values for the log transformation.) We re-ran 
the main left-right analysis using the unadjusted values. 
This is straightforward for the d metric, and yielded 
very similar results, as expected (for the ratings data: 
r = -.50 before and after; for Wikipedia data, r = -.47 
before and after). For the log10RR metric, this alternative 
specification yielded a small increase in effect sizes, due 
to the removal of many datapoints corresponding to right-
wing parties with observed 0% support among journalists 
(n dropped from 132 to 120). The observed changes were 
quite minor, however: the log10RR left-right correlations 
changed from -.53 to -.55 for the Wikipedia data, and 
from -.53 to -.56 for the ratings data.
Second, recall that we excluded data for parties with 
Table 4. Average political position of journalists and the general population of voters, by country. Participant ratings 
were used to calculate positions. The ratings derived from the Wikipedia data correlated at r = .86 with these, but did not 
include the USA.
Political position and bias results by country
Wikipedia-based political position Rater-based political position
Country Journalist mean General pop. mean Bias wikipedia Country Journalist mean General pop. mean Bias
1 Austria -0.36 0.62 -0.97 Austria -0.77 0.33 -1.10
2 France -0.73 0.20 -0.93 France -1.08 -0.27 -0.81
3 Switzerland -0.22 0.66 -0.89 Switzerland -0.06 0.63 -0.69
4 Denmark -0.75 0.10 -0.86 Denmark -0.69 0.01 -0.69
5 Ireland -0.66 0.18 -0.84 Ireland -0.85 -0.26 -0.58
6 Sweden -0.65 0.06 -0.71 Sweden -0.85 -0.18 -0.67
7 Norway -0.37 0.18 -0.56 Norway -0.21 0.25 -0.46
8 United Kingdom -0.31 0.23 -0.54 United Kingdom 0.01 0.52 -0.51
9 Poland 0.48 0.98 -0.50 Poland 0.70 1.11 -0.42
10 Finland -0.26 0.24 -0.50 Finland -0.64 -0.03 -0.61
11 Belgium -0.46 0.02 -0.48 Belgium -0.71 -0.14 -0.57
12 Netherlands -0.59 -0.14 -0.45 Netherlands -0.71 -0.21 -0.50
13 Australia -0.11 0.24 -0.35 Australia -0.17 0.25 -0.42
14 Canada -0.30 0.01 -0.31 Canada 0.28 0.38 -0.10
15 Germany -0.59 -0.38 -0.21 Germany -0.69 -0.29 -0.40
16 Slovenia 0.19 0.35 -0.17 Slovenia -0.06 -0.09 0.03
USA 0.51 0.88 -0.37
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Of course, our analyses have a number of important 
limitations. First, not all the surveys of journalists had 
large sample sizes. Ideally, one would want a large, 
representative sample of journalists from each country. 
However, we often had to rely on ad hoc samples of 
journalists, (e.g. a survey from a particular region or city, 
or one based on a limited number of outlets.) The sample 
sizes varied from small (<100) to large (>1,000). The 
smaller surveys may of course yield uncertain estimates of 
journalists’ preference for or against a given party. When 
we analyzed the effect of inclusion threshold, an indirect 
way of evaluating the effects of sampling error, we found 
that increasing the threshold did not weaken the results.
Second, many of the surveys were somewhat older 
than we would have liked. We attempted to find samples 
collected within the last 22 years (1998 onward) to reduce 
drift in party ideology between the time of the survey 
and the time party data were added Wikipedia. We only 
included older surveys when we were unable to find newer 
ones, based on the assumption that some slightly older 
data is preferable to no data at all for a given country. In 
addition, we did not find a substantial effect of sample age 
in our analyses.
Third, despite collecting data for multiple years, there 
were still some Western countries for which we were 
(Wikipedia, log10RR). Hence there does not appear to be 
a notable effect of source age on our results. In fact, our 
inclusivity tended to weaken the results slightly.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
We have attempted to quantify the political skew of 
Western media by comparing survey data on journalists’ 
voting behaviour to national election results. Our results 
showed that journalists lean left overall (Section 3.1), 
and that they are particularly unsupportive of national 
conservatism, while being particularly supportive of 
feminism, immigration and the EU (Section 3.2). In 
multivariate analysis using Bayesian model averaging 
(Section 3.3), we found that three ideology tags were 
consistent predictors: conservatism (negative), nationalism 
(negative), and green (positive). The findings we observed 
were generally robust to alternative specifications and 
sensitivity checks (Section 3.5). We believe they are 
unlikely to change much upon collection of additional 
data. Indeed, we wrote most of the analysis code early on 
in the process of data collection, and monitored the results 
as new data came in. The findings presented here are 
quite similar to those observed when data on only a few 
countries were available.
Figure 10. Left-right correlation results across minimum party support exclusion rule values.
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the scientific process itself, given that findings reported 
in the media receive more attention from scientists and 
tend to get cited more [39]–[41]. The academic performance 
of authors whose work is selected for coverage (quantified 
by means of citation indexes) will increase, and they will be 
likely to receive more funding for that line of research. This 
gives the authors an incentive to produce more research 
in the same vein. The process we have just outlined is 
illustrated in the flowchart shown in Figure 11.
It is important to mention that the potential impact of 
political bias is only statistical. Despite being left-leaning, 
the media and academia obviously produce many stories 
and research findings that are not “friendly” to left-wing 
causes. However, it is plausible that they produce fewer 
of these stories and findings than they would do in the 
absence of the observed political skew. This model is not a 
conspiracy theory because it does not postulate any secret 
coordination between large numbers of actors in different 
areas.9
4.2 Increasing Media Bias
Several studies have documented an increase in the 
left-liberal skew of Western media in recent decades [42-45]. 
But what factors may have given rise to such an increase, 
if it has in fact occurred? Shafer and Doherty (2017) [42] 
argue that the increase in political bias in the media is 
attributable to deep-rooted economic factors. They show 
that media personnel increasingly work in coastal areas 
which are left-wing. According to their calculations based 
on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data, 
the percentage of newspaper and internet-publishing 
workers working in a county where Democrats won 
increased from 61% in 2008 to 72% in 2016. Furthermore, 
the percentage of these individuals who worked in a 
country that was won by more than 30% points increased 
from 32% to 51%. Their results are even starker for 
internet media personnel: 90% of such individuals worked 
in a county won by Clinton, and 75% worked in a country 
where she won by more than 30% points. The reason for 
the increasing urbanization of journalists seems to be the 
expansion of national media at the expense of local media, 
which is presumably tied at least in part to the decline in 
advertising revenues for newspapers.
9 Note that there has been at least one case of large-scale secret 
collaboration, namely JournoList (Calderone, 2009). Ezra Klein (the 
former editor of Vox) ran a secret discussion forum (a Google Group) 
for several hundred left-leaning “bloggers, political reporters, magazine 
writers, policy wonks and academics”. The individuals on this list 
sometimes worked together on pieces that later appeared in the news, 
and even plotted to collectively kill stories they considered damaging to 
their political goals (Strong, 2010).
unable to obtain any relevant survey data. Unfortunately, 
these were not randomly located, but rather concentrated 
in southern and eastern Europe. The Southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy, Spain) were center stage in both 
the Eurozone debt crisis and the European migrant crisis, 
while the eastern European countries (Hungary, Czech 
Republic) have featured prominently in the news due to 
their opposition to accepting migrants. Hence it would 
be particularly interesting to assess the political skew of 
journalists in these countries. And indeed, it is possible 
that the political skew we detected would have been lower 
if data from more countries had been available. We hope 
that the present study will inspire further research on 
journalists’ voting behavior, and reveal data sources that 
we missed.
Fourth, voting patterns reflect voters’ political 
preferences, but they are by no means a perfect gauge of 
such preferences. While we were able to study several 
aspects of journalists’ political attitudes indirectly through 
reported voting behaviour and vote intentions, some 
dimensions of their political attitudes were not covered 
at all, making it difficult to say precisely which way 
journalists lean on the relevant issues.
4.1 Journalists and Academics
Notwithstanding the limitations outlined above, we 
believe the empirical results we have presented are 
relevant to understanding the general flow of information 
within society. To explain why, it is necessary to expand 
our discussion to the political leanings of academics. Like 
journalists, academics mostly produce words for a living. 
Whereas journalists write news articles about current 
events, academics write reports about current research. 
Over the last few years, there has been a surge of interest 
in the political leanings of academics [24,35-38]. The results 
from this literature mirror those seen for journalists, but 
generally reveal even larger skews towards left-wing 
parties and political attitudes. For example, Langbert 
(2018) [24] found that the ratio of Democrat to Republican 
professors was 17.4:1 in History, 43.8:1 in Sociology and 
133:1 in Anthropology.
The effects of political skews in journalism and 
academia may exert synergistic effects insofar as many 
news stories relate to findings from new studies published 
by academics. As a result, the process we described in 
the introduction (Figure 1) may lead to biased coverage 
of new research findings. One would expect journalists to 
preferentially report findings that comport with their own 
political views, and to interview sources who they suspect 
will give a favourable interpretation of the importance or 
validity of the findings. This tendency may interact with 
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in the newsroom means that anyone with a story that 
conservatives might prefer to see in print had a designated 
go-to person. Although this cannot by itself counteract 
the overall slant of a newsroom, it can at least ensure 
that every important “conservative” story has a chance 
of being told. Depending on how hiring usually works, 
this kind of low level affirmative action (keep at least one 
right-winger in the newsroom at left-wing newspapers, 
and vice versa at right-wing newspapers) might be a 
fruitful option for newspapers to consider.
Rather than trying to alter the ideological composition 
of the newsroom, one could attempt to forestall biases that 
may arise during the journalistic production process itself. 
In science, many such proposals have been made [35], and 
some have been partially implemented (e.g., registered 
reports). For example, one way bias distorts science is 
through what is termed researcher degrees of freedom, i.e., 
researchers can analyze their data in many different ways, 
and then only report the analyses that produced results 
favourable to their hypothesis [47-48]. Those results are then 
published, while the results from the alternative analyses, 
which yielded null or perhaps even negative results, 
remain unpublished. Because of the low evidentiary 
standards in social science, one can almost always find 
something in a given dataset that could be construed as 
supporting a particular hypothesis.11 When the hypothesis 
under consideration has some relevance to public policy, 
as is often the case, this tendency may give rise to a 
general slant in the research findings.
Policies aiming to reduce bias in the journalistic 
4.3 Proposals for Reducing Political Bias
Proposals for increasing political diversity among 
academics have focused on raising awareness and 
creating a more hospitable environment for dissidents 
[35]. We are not aware of any general attempts to increase 
political diversity among journalists, presumably because 
people prefer to choose from among an assortment of 
media outlets, each with a relatively obvious slant. One 
exception is the proposal mentioned by Groseclose (2012) 
[7]. Specifically, the Minneapolis Star Tribune ran an 
experiment where they hired a self-identified conservative 
to increase viewpoint diversity in their newsroom. As 
explained by Lambert (2007) [46],
When the tinny tinkle of “Joy to the World, the 
Lord Is Come” begins playing on the cell phone, 
everyone in range in the Star Tribune newsroom 
knows who’s getting a call. It is Katherine Kersten, 
the paper’s unapologetically religious and fiercely 
conservative metro columnist.
Since May 2005, the Star Tribune has been 
engaged in what its top editor freely describes as “an 
experiment.” The test has Katherine Kersten, a fifty-
five-year-old former banker, and think-tank denizen, 
now an opinion writer, playing the role of an alien 
element injected into a tradition-bound newspaper 
culture.
Long battered by conservative critics as the “Red 
Star” for its alleged knee-jerk liberalism … the 
Star Tribune decided it had to answer. For the last 
twenty months, Kersten has been an one-woman 
solution, applying a decidedly different, and perhaps 
revolutionary, face to the role of big-city reporter 
and metro columnist.
The presence of a single self-identified conservative 
Figure 11. Flowchart of the scientific process with political bias of journalists and scientists.10
10 We acknowledge that a similar version of this chart was originally 
created by J.P. de Ruiter.
11 The reader can see this for himself by playing with the interactive 
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production process have already been implemented in 
certain countries. In the US, for example, the equal-time 
rule was implemented as early as 1934 [49] (Miller, 2013, 
p. 359). This rule specifies that radio and TV stations 
must provide air time to opposing political candidates 
who request it. Of course, a detailed discussion how to 
counteract media bias is beyond the scope of this paper.
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